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Abstract

On 24 July 2003, the European Court of Justice handed down its judgment in
the Altmark case, ending the controversy surrounding the application of the EC
state aid control regime to compensation granted to undertakings in consideration
for public service obligations imposed on them.
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State aid and financing of
public services
A comment on the recent Altmark judgment of the Court of Justice
By Frédéric Louis and Anne Vallery, Wilmer Cutler & Pickering*
On 24 July 2003, the European Court of Justice handed down
its judgment in the Altmark case, ending the controversy
surrounding the application of the EC state aid control regime
to compensation granted to undertakings in consideration for
public service obligations imposed on them.
The Court held that such compensation does not confer an
advantage on the undertakings concerned, and hence does not
constitute state aid within the meaning of the EC Treaty, provided four conditions are satisfied:
• first, the beneficiary has effectively been entrusted with
clearly defined public service obligations
• second, the parameters for calculating the compensation
must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner
• third, the compensation does not exceed what is necessary
to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the
public service obligations, taking into account the revenue
such obligations may generate and the fact that the beneficiary is entitled to make a reasonable profit for discharging
these obligations
• fourth, either the undertaking selected to discharge the
public service obligation is chosen pursuant to a public
procurement procedure or, failing this, the level of compensation is determined on the basis of an analysis of what
it would cost a typical, well-run undertaking to discharge
these obligations, again taking into account the revenue
such obligations may generate and the right for the
beneficiary to make a reasonable profit
This judgment will enable member states to organise public
services without having to submit their financing mechanisms
for prior European Commission scrutiny under the state aid
control rules. However, the Court has been careful to provide
for a number of safeguards to make sure that its ruling is not
used by member states to favour certain undertakings under
the guise of compensating them for the costs incurred in discharging public service obligations.
The mechanism of state aid control under the
EC Treaty
Article 87(1) introduces a general prohibition of state aid,
while providing for a number of compulsory or discretionary
exemptions to this prohibition under article 87(2) and (3). For
a state measure to be caught by the prohibition, it must meet
four conditions:

•

there must be a financial intervention by the state or
through state resources
• this intervention must confer an advantage on the beneficiary
• it must distort or threaten to distort competition
• it must be liable to affect trade between member states
In the past, there was some controversy among legal authors as
to whether all four of these conditions had to be met for a state
measure to fall within the definition of state aid under article
87(1). Some authors felt that only the conditions of state intervention and of advantage to a company were part of the definition, while the conditions of distortion of competition and
of effect on trade between member states were not part of the
definition but conditions to be met in order for state aid to be
prohibited under article 87(1).
The Court had given some indications on this issue in the
past, but the Altmark judgment puts an end to all controversy
by making it clear that all four conditions have to be met for
a state measure to fall within the definition of state aid. This
has consequences notably for the obligation to notify state aid
measures to the Commission under article 88(3).
State aid can take the form of a straightforward subsidy, an
interest-free or low-interest loan, a state guarantee, a tax
exemption or an exemption from the obligation to pay social
security or other charges, favourable prices for goods or services provided by public undertakings, etc.
Under article 88(3), member states are obliged to notify the
Commission of their intention to grant aid before they finally
adopt the aid measure. In addition, they must respect a standstill obligation until the Commission decides whether the
notified measure constitutes state aid and, if so, whether such
aid is compatible with the common market, i.e. whether it
meets the conditions for one of the exemptions provided for
in article 87(2) or (3).
State aid granted in violation of the notification or standstill
obligations is deemed to be illegal aid. If the Commission finds
that such illegal aid is furthermore incompatible with the
common market, it will – save in exceptional circumstances –
order the guilty member state to recover the amounts of aid
(including interest at commercial rates as from the moment
when the aid was illegally granted) from the beneficiary. In
addition, the Commission is empowered to make a provisional
decision ordering the offending member state to suspend or
provisionally recover the unlawfully granted aid.
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State aid and public services
Member states’ courts are not empowered to rule on the
compatibility of a state aid measure with the common market.
However, they can decide whether or not a contested measure
constitutes state aid within the meaning of article 87(1) and,
where such aid has been unlawfully granted in violation of the
notification or standstill obligations, they must pronounce on
the illegality of the aid and take all measures to undo its effects.
Beyond the specific exemptions from the prohibition of state
aid provided for by article 87(2) and (3), article 86(2) provides
for a general exception to the application of the Treaty rules
to undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of
general economic interest where the application of such rules
would obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the
particular tasks entrusted to these undertakings, provided this
exception does not affect trade between member states in a way
that would be detrimental to the interests of the Community.
Compensation for public service obligations:
the issue and its relevance
In the Altmark case, a local bus company benefited from 18
licences to operate bus passenger services in a German district
for which it received a subsidy from the public authorities. A
competitor challenged the grant of the licences, arguing inter
alia that the beneficiary could not survive without the subsidy.
The German Federal Administrative Court queried whether
the subsidy constituted state aid and put a question to this
effect to the European Court. It should be noted that the
Altmark case raised a number of issues relating to the treatment
of public service obligations and state aid in the transport
sector, which is subject to a specific regime under the EC
Treaty. These issues are not discussed here.
Although the referring German court was primarily
interested in knowing whether state financing to a local transport company could affect trade between member states
within the meaning of article 87(1), the Court briefly confirmed that this was the case since this condition has traditionally been interpreted very broadly.
It chose rather to concentrate on a different issue, namely
whether compensation granted by a member state to an
undertaking in consideration for the public service obligations
it has been entrusted with constitutes state aid and is therefore
subject to the Commission’s prior approval.
The net result of deciding that such compensation constitutes state aid would be twofold:
(i) in the case of notification, such compensation could not be
granted until the Commission had approved it,
(ii) if the compensation was granted in the absence of a
notification to the Commission, or in violation of the
standstill obligation, any interested party could object to
the payment of such compensation before national courts.
On the other hand, should it be decided that compensation
granted in consideration for the discharge of a public service
obligation does not constitute a real advantage to the undertaking entrusted with the obligation and therefore does not
constitute state aid, then such compensation measures would
entirely escape the discipline of the state aid control mechanism.
Over recent years, national courts have put a number of
preliminary questions to the Court, illustrating the relevance
of the issue the Court decided in Altmark:
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Ferring: In the Ferring case, a pharmaceutical company
argued that it should not have to pay a tax levied on direct
supplies to retailers, which had been introduced in France to
offset the disadvantage that wholesalers in pharmaceutical
products suffered as a result of the public service obligations
imposed on them by the French state. These obligations were
not imposed on pharmaceutical companies’ direct deliveries to
retailers. The pharmaceutical company argued that the scheme
constituted state aid in favour of the wholesalers. Since the
scheme had not been notified to the Commission, it argued
that the French courts should refuse to apply it and hence that
it should not be made to pay the tax. The French state argued
that the scheme did not constitute aid since it merely offset the
costs supported by the wholesalers as a result of their public
service obligations.
Enirisorse: In the Enirisorse case, an Italian company challenges a port tax on the grounds that part of the proceeds of
the charge went to public undertakings entrusted with dockside loading and unloading of goods at certain ports, despite
the fact that it had not made use of the services of these
undertakings. One of the arguments put forward is that this
constitutes unlawful state aid, while the Italian authorities
argue that the charge was necessary to distribute the costs of
the public loading and unloading services provided by the
beneficiaries.
Gemo: In the Gemo case, a French supermarket contests a
meat purchase tax imposed on supermarkets but not on small
meat retailers. Revenue from the tax is meant to finance a
public service for the collection and disposal of animal carcasses and dangerous slaughterhouse waste, provided free of charge
to farmers and slaughterhouses by private carcass disposal
undertakings remunerated by the state under contracts awarded
after public procurement procedures. The supermarket’s contention is that this scheme constitutes state aid for the farmers
and slaughterhouses (and the small meat retailers), which is
unlawful since it has not been notified to the Commission. It
therefore asks the French courts to set aside its obligation to
pay the tax. The French authorities argue that the scheme
compensates the disposal operators for their public service
obligations and therefore does not constitute state aid.
In all these cases, there is an additional issue – whether
article 86(2) may not provide a solution to a finding that the
financing scheme for public service obligations constitutes
unlawful state aid. As mentioned above, article 86(2) contains
an escape clause for undertakings entrusted with a service of
general economic interest not to be subject to the Treaty rules
where this would obstruct the performance of their tasks.
However, it is not clear that article 86(2) could be relied on
by national courts as a reason not to set aside aid measures
granted in violation of the notification and standstill
obligations imposed by article 88(3). In a previous judgment,
the Court has indeed already decided that member states could
not rely on article 86(2) to evade the notification and standstill
obligations.
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State aid and public services
Divided opinions
The Court of First Instance has taken the view in a number of
cases that measures granted in compensation for a public service obligation constitute state aid and are therefore subject to
the discipline of the state aid control regime instituted by the
EC Treaty, although they may be declared compatible with the
common market under one of the exemptions provided for in
article 87(2) or (3) (by the Commission, following a notification) or may be held to benefit from the exception laid
down in article 86(2).
Faced with the question on the tax on direct sales to retailers
by pharmaceutical companies in the Ferring case, the Sixth
Chamber of the Court of Justice, adopting the opinion of
Advocate General Tizzano, took the opposite view from the
Court of First Instance and decided that the tax at issue would
only constitute state aid to the exempted wholesalers in pharmaceutical products “to the extent that the advantage in not
being assessed to the tax on direct sales of medicines exceeds
the additional costs that they bear in discharging the public
service obligations imposed on them by national law.”
The Court further held that, to the extent that the
advantage enjoyed by the wholesalers exceeded the costs of the
public service obligations that they bore, such advantage
would constitute state aid that would not benefit from the exception under article 86(2) since such aid by definition would
not be necessary to enable the wholesalers to discharge their
public obligations.
In his first opinion in the Altmark case, Advocate General
Léger severely criticised the judgment in Ferring and suggested
that the Court should reverse it. He took the view that the
Court in Ferring had confused the characterisation of measures
as state aid and the justification for a measure once it has been
characterised as state aid. Mr Léger felt that the judgment
deprived article 86(2) of its effect, while the conditions for the
application of this article were stricter than the conditions set
by the Court in Ferring for the definition of state aid.
In other words, measures that in the past would have been
considered as state aid and would not have met the conditions
to benefit from article 86(2) would now escape all scrutiny.
Advocate General Léger also feared that the Ferring test would
effectively remove state measures for the financing of public
services from the Commission’s control of state aid. He thus
proposed that the Court should rule that subsidies granted to
offset the costs of a public service obligation were liable to
constitute state aid.
In an opinion given a few months later, Advocate General
Jacobs adopted a compromise position, suggesting that a
distinction should be made between state measures showing a
direct and manifest link between the financing granted and the
public service obligations imposed, where these obligations are
clearly defined, and measures “where it is not clear from the
outset that the state funding is intended as a quid pro quo for
clearly defined general interest obligations.”
Mr Jacobs conceded that his proposed distinction might not
always be easy to draw. In his view, however, this solution may
give member states “an incentive to grant compensation for
the provision of general interest services on the basis of unequivocal and transparent arrangements, and perhaps even on
the basis of public service contracts awarded after open,
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transparent and non-discriminatory public procurement
procedures.”
In yet another case, Advocate General Stix-Hackl agreed
with the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs.
The Court’s judgment in Altmark
In view of these divergent opinions, the Altmark case was
entrusted to the full Court of Justice. It was decided to reopen the procedure to afford all parties the opportunity to
comment on Ferring and the ensuing discussions in the different opinions of the Court’s own Advocates General.
In the event, six member states intervened and, as it
happens, split evenly with three suggesting that the Court
should confirm the Ferring solution and three arguing that it
should adopt the compromise solution put forward by
Advocate General Jacobs.
As for Advocate General Léger, in a second opinion in the
Altmark case given on 14 January 2003, he persisted in his first
opinion that the Court should simply reverse Ferring.
In its judgment on 24 July, the full Court adopted a solution
clearly inspired by Advocate General Jacobs’s opinion. First of
all, the Court did confirm Ferring in holding that a state
measure to finance public obligations is not state aid within the
meaning of article 87(1) where it “must be regarded as compensation for the services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, so that
those undertakings do not enjoy a real financial advantage and
the measure thus does not have the effect of putting them in a
more favourable competitive position than the undertakings
competing with them” (para 87).
However, the Court showed sensitivity to the arguments
that had been put to it that, without more, the Ferring formula
may make it tempting for member states to advantage some
undertakings unduly, since it enables them to refrain from
notifying their intended measures of financial support to the
Commission, while not having to worry about the consequences in the national court.
For this reason, the Court subjected the Ferring solution to
a number of relatively stringent conditions meant to ensure
that it would only be applied in the most clear-cut cases:
• the public service obligations being compensated must be
clearly defined in national law
• the compensation for such obligations must be based on
parameters that have been determined in advance, in an
objective and transparent manner
• the compensation cannot exceed the costs of the public
service obligations, but the Court does concede that these
“costs” may include “a reasonable profit” (para 92)
• the Court encourages member states to select the public
service providers through a public procurement procedure,
in the absence of which the compensation will have to be
based, not on the actual costs of the undertaking entrusted
with the public service obligations, but on the costs of a
“typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided
with the means [of performing the services]” – meaning,
presumably, a normally efficient and economically viable
company. Again, the Court allows for the fact that the
typical service provider used as a basis for the costs to be
compensated is entitled to “a reasonable profit” (para 93)
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State aid and public services
Consequences of the judgment
The Altmark solution illustrates the way that the Court is able
to enact quasi-regulatory requirements that member states will
have to take into account if they wish to avail themselves of the
favourable regime heralded by the Ferring judgment.
While the Court maintains the Ferring solution, it surrounds
it with significant constraints on the ability of member states
to organise the provision of public services as they see fit. In
particular, with the fourth condition attached to its judgment,
the Court is clearly pushing member states towards a policy of
systematic allocation of public service contracts through open
bid procedures.
This requirement appears to be justified from a legal point
of view since it can be argued that state financing that would
reward providers of public services for their inefficiency would
constitute an advantage, and hence state aid, to these providers. A public bid procedure is the best way to make sure that
public services will be discharged in the most efficient manner.
While these constraints may perhaps create a significant burden, in particular for local authorities, the transparency and
efficiency thus promoted by the Court can only be positive for
the provision of public services.
The Altmark judgment has brought significant clarification
to the treatment of the financing of public services in the
European Union. However, there are still important issues that
will require further clarification through case law in order for
their scope to be clearly defined, such as what constitutes
reasonable profit. This notion has proved to be quite elusive in
other areas of EC law, such as the issue of what constitutes
abusively high pricing under article 82 or the regulation of
interconnection and access issues in the telecoms field.
Also unresolved is the question of the role that article 86(2)
may play for all cases of state financing of public services that
will not benefit from the Altmark rule. Indeed, while article
86(2) does not enable state aid to public services providers to
escape from the notification and standstill obligations, it may
be argued that allowing a national court to draw all consequences from the illegality of such aid granted in violation of
these obligations may at least hamper the provision of public
services in certain circumstances.
Could the beneficiary rely on article 86(2) in such circumstances to set aside the obligation of national courts to take all
measures to undo the effects of illegal aid? In view of the
divergent views that were expressed by the Advocates General
on the proper scope and consequences of article 86(2) in the

field of state aid, it is to be regretted that the Court did not
seize the opportunity also to address this issue in its judgment.
This last issue is important. Significant areas of state
intervention in favour of public services will not benefit from
the Altmark judgment. For instance, this will be the case for
general exemptions from income and other taxes that, by their
nature, do not reflect exactly the costs of provision of public
services.
Another frequent type of state intervention in support of
public services – the compensation of losses incurred on an a
posteriori, ad hoc basis – will also be considered to be state aid.
This will have to be notified to the Commission for approval
(which approval could then be granted under the specific
exceptions of article 87(2) or (3) or, arguably, under article
86(2)) or, failing a notification, run the risk of national
litigation where the beneficiary will have to argue that the
measures in question are saved by article 86(2).
In any event, it seems clear from the Ferring judgment – as
the Court in Altmark did not go back on this part of the Ferring
ruling – that article 86(2) may not be relied on to save state
financing that would over-compensate a provider for
discharging its public service obligations. State financing that
exceeded the costs of provision of these obligations and a
reasonable profit for the service provider will indeed be
considered unnecessary to allow the public service provider to
perform its tasks.
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Commission disputes Council’s approval of Belgian tax breaks
The two EU institutions are on a confrontation course over the special tax
regime for multinational companies that
run their administration and finances
from a centre in Belgium.
This regime was found to entail unlawful state aid by the Commission in a
decision made on 17 February 2003. The
decision let existing arrangements run
their course, but not be renewed.
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On 16 July, on Belgium’s request, the
Council authorised the entire regime to
continue until 2006, including renewal.
The Commission acknowledges the
Council’s power to approve state aid, but
only before it has itself made a decision.
This must be something of an irritant,
but it is clearly allowed by article 88(2).
However, what the Council did in this
case was to overrule an existing adjudi-

cation by the Commission. Accordingly,
the Commission filed a case against the
Council at the Court.
This case joins appeals against the
Commission’s decision that had already
been filed by an association of affected
companies and by Belgium (Cases C217/03 and C-182/03). On 26 June, the
Court suspended the decision’s effect on
renewals already pending on 17 February.
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